a. Legal Rights of Androids/Chimera. Extension of ‘Common Benefits’ to Common Humanity [ajl]
b. Metaphysics of Androids/Chimera.
i. “I explore this question as both an ethical and metaphysical problem. I take Friedrich Nietzsche’s point to be germane, hat essence, or being, is an empty abstraction from life and from life’s joys. Having inherited a metaphysic of being, we are unsure of what to do with our freedom, including the freedom to create chimeras. Augustine, set the course: because humans are being and not becoming, freedom can only mean free to do because we will what our essence was created to be in the divine blue-print. Freedom is reserved for God alone. To suggest otherwise is to suggest that God lacks something, because a truly free being cannot be determined and therefore has an open and unknowable future. A theology of essence denies human freedom; therefore, the creation of destructive technologies [is] only putatively born of the human mind and [is] in actuality born of God. The problem of God in a post-human world is, once again, the problem of evil.” [pp p. 1]
ii. “The sort of theology I would like to do, takes seriously the linear, possibly multi-linear, thinking evolutionary theory has given us and cannot claim any post factor pure ontological distinction. We are becoming and evolving, as such we have real ethical responsibilities which we cannot evade.” [pp p. 2]
iii. “My proposal, in brief, is that we understand semiotic machines (whether human or not) as contributing toward what God values as sacred on a continuum . . . What may be judged in the end is not the empty abstractness of essence or being, but the concrete actuality, new in very instance and made continuous not by any memory bank or hard-drive, but by its contribution to God’s enjoyment.” [pp p. 5]
iv. “. . . we can look forward to one day treating conscious computers like people.” [d]
b. Ethics—“Christianity cannot be supposed adequate unless it offers constructive, ethical guidelines for the use and integration of chimeras into our society.” [pp p. 3]
3. Natural-Secular-NeoPragmatism [afd]
a. In the science-fiction novel by Philip K. Dick, Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? (Blade Runner, the movie), androids sometimes escape slavery and need to be detected by a psychological test for empathy, the only human trait they lack. “The meaning of being human is [also] largely revealed in the history and future of the human-android-pet relationships (where religion, incidentally, is yet another subtheme of the novel seen in the struggle between Buster Friendly, a mindless continual TV show and Mercerism, a mindless religion based on an over inflated empathy via mind-meld empathy boxes, which among other things shows that a good thing, empathy, can be absurd when taken to extremes).”
b. “To make the android humanlike, we must investigate human activity from the standpoint of [cognitive science, behavioral science and neuroscience], and to evaluate human activity, we need to implement processes that support it in the android.” [i]
c. “Systems theory suggests that change and choice are dependent on having a certain amount of instability, of abandoning rigid ways of thinking and being. It thus, at least metaphorically, supports a Heraclitean and postmodern social theoretical view of the inherent importance of change, and thus, the ability to think flexibly and creatively and make choices. The discourse of change is an essential part of emancipation, of establishing an open society. But the essential source of change comes from within (self-organization, in systems language, including options for creative change). These conditions of flexibility best flourish with a great deal of personal courage in the face of our existential-cyborgian anxiety, and often despite conditions of inequality and oppression in a society.” [afd pp. 255-256]
d. “What then about intelligent life that can self-reflect and even transcend our limited consciousness? Humans have indeed come forth in our manifest cosmos. And humans, as evolving life forms and cultures, are surely not finished. How might we personally develop; how might life forms evolve? At this dangerous crossroads for planet Earth and our own individual futures, how can we better live for ourselves and for all of creation, while manifesting the underlying beauty of a cosmos that holds the mysteries of life? Perhaps everyday creativity can help show us the way.” [r p. 314]
Abraham, F.D. (2007). Cyborgs, Cyberspace, Cybersexuality: the Evolution of Everyday Creativity. In R. Richards (ed.), Everyday Creativity and New Views of Human Nature. Washington: American Psychological Association. Updated as Cybersexuality at http://www.blueberry-brain.org/chaosophy/Cybersexuality/Cybersexuality-creativity-bbi-v6a2.htm [afd]
Amestoy, J.L. (2003). Uncommon Humanity: Reflections on Judging in a Post-Human Era. New Yourk University Law Review, 78(5), 1581-1595). [ajl]
Baker vs. State (Vt, 1999). 744, A.2nd. http://www.kentlaw.iit.edu/perritt/conflicts/vtcase.html
Bultmann, R. (1951-1955). Theology of the New Testament, 2 vols. K. Grobel, trans. New York: Scribner’s
Cobb, J.B. (1990). The Structure of Christian Existence. Lanham: University Press of America.
Deacon, T.W. (1998). The Symbolic Species:The Co-evolution of Language and the Brain. New York: Norton. [d]
Dick, P.K. (1968). Do androids dream of electric sheep? New York: Ballantine. (Adpted for Scott’s film, Bladerunner.)
Fukuyama, F. (2002). Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Garreau, J. (2005). Radical Evolution: The Promise and Peril of Enhancing Our Minds, Our Bodies—and What It Means to Be Human. Doubleday.
Gibson, W. (1984). Neuromancer. New York: Ace.
Goertzel, B. (2004). The All-Seeing (A)I: Universal Mind Simulation as a Possible Path to Stably Benevolent Superhuman AI. Dynamical Psychology. http://www.goertzel.org/dynapsyc/2004/AllSeeingAI.htm
Haraway, D. (1985). A manifesto for cyborgs: Science, technology and socialist feminism in the 1980’s. Socialist Review, 80, 65-107.
Hayles, N.K. (1999). How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics. Chicago: Chicago.
Heidegger, M. (1954). Die Frage nach der Technik (The Question Concerning Technology). [Nazi; thus a problem for Derrida.]
Hornyak, T. (2006a, May). Android science. Scientific American, 32-34.
Ishiguro, H. (2005). Interactive humanoids and androids as ideal interfaces for humans. ICMI Archive, Proceedings of the 7th international conference on multimodal interfaces, 137. New York: ACM Press. ICMI electronic archive: http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=1088463.1088465. [i]
Jefferson, T. (1787). Notes on the State of Virginia. http://etext.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer-new2?id=JefVirg.sgm&images=images/modeng&data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=public&part=17&division=div1 [j]
Joy, B. (2000). Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us. Wired, April 2000).
Kass, L.R. (2002). Human Cloning and Human Dignity: The Report of the President’s Council on Bioethics.
Lyotard, J-F. (1988-9). Can thought go on without a body? Discourse, 11 (1), 74-87.
Magnani, T.A. (1999). The Patentability of Human-Animal Chimeras, 14, Berkelely Tech. L.J. 443, 450.
Moravec, H. (1988). Mind children: The future of robot and human intelligence. Cambridge: Harvard.
Plagge, P. (2003). Towards a Post-Human Metaphysic. [pp]
Richards, R. (ed.), Everyday Creativity and New Views of Human Nature. Washington: American Psychological Association. [r]
Sarup, M. (1993). An introductory guide to Post-structuralism and Postmodernism (2nd ed.). Athens: Georgia. [s]
Stock, G. (2002). Redesigning Humans: Choosing our Genes, Changing our Future. New York: Houghton Mifflin.
Ullman, E. (2002). Programmin the Post-Human: Computer Science Redefines “Life”. Harper’s Magazine, October, 2002, pp. 60-62
Wolmark, J. (Ed.). (1999). Cybersexualities. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
1 February 2009; updated 4 February 2009