Critical Psychology: Psychology with an Attitude

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Critical psychology is subversive in two ways: it wants to participate in the politics of emancipation, and it wants to subvert academia’s “disciplinary partitioning”. (H, p. 21) And it wants traditional psychology to stop supporting those forms and processes of power—cultural, economic, and political—that are oppressive. Hook identifies an obstacle to accomplishing this program; psychology tends to objectify by isolating critical factors of human nature, to ignore context, and thus, paradoxically, to dehumanize. (H, p. 4.) But the contextual features of the psycho-social systems are necessary to understand what is critical, a concept that is similar to Said’s ‘secular criticism.’ (H, p. 19.) Instead, psychology must empathize with its social context, and to meet the responsibilities of that passion, to become involved in social action, to become participatory. Steve Biko was killed while in the custody of South African Security Police in 1967; Fanon, a psychiatrist, was involved in the Algerian revolution. Martin-Baró, social psychologist and priest, was shot by the Salvadoran army. My own dismissal from UCLA’s Psychiatry Department for fighting their racism and genderism seems a tad tepid compared to those kinds of commitment.

These examples of involvement in racist contexts exemplify Hook’s emphasis on the importance of fusing postcolonial discourse with critical psychology. After all, the postmodern lineage of critical theory, poststructuralism, and postcolonialism had long conflated economic theory (Marxist), existentialism (Nietzsche), and psychology (Freud). It appears that the psychopolitical dynamics become dramatically evident in such extremely repressive societies as the Apartheid world of Hook’s experience as a professor in South Africa, and probably account, in large measure, for his ability to make the issues so clear. Many features of the Apartheid dynamics generalize to societies that do not have such an extremely brutal form of oppression. For example, my own experience in introducing a course in critical psychology into the graduate curriculum at our university in the Philippines, I was unaware that skin color was a factor in their culture, which influenced one student who pointed out to me after reading Hook (2005, ‘lactification’, p. ; or ‘white masks’, 2012, p. 18), though the dynamics may have had some differences in the Philippines, with an emergent urbanized middle class trying to distance themselves from their tribal roots, and with a mercantile class exploiting and ignoring poverty and despoiling the land of aboriginal peoples with logging and mining (which probably
contributed to the recent floods there, where the resulting damage was not confined to the disruption of the lives and societies of traditional peoples as many rivers ran destructively from rural to urban areas).

Hook wants to inject the aggressiveness of postcolonial critique into creating a “new domain within . . . [critical psychology].” (H, p. 6) I consider that critical and liberation psychology have already self-organized into that domain, largely under the influence of Enriquez (1990), Hook (2005), Levin (2009), Martin-Baró (1994), and many others, and noted by me (2010). Perhaps we should use a more vivid expressive phrase, one mentioned by Hook, such as “critical liberation psychology.” (H, p. 22) Hook does want to maintain a dialogue with and make contributions to traditional theory and research in social psychology in “key topic areas . . . to which postcolonial and psychoanalytic thought make crucial contributions.” (H, p. 6)

Hook notes some intricate continuity of modern forms of racism with historic forms, Said’s contrapuntal reading, which, as in Western music, interweaves past, present, and future themes (Said, 1984, 1993, Chowdry, 2007) which flows from attention to contexts and from transdisciplinary scholarship. (H, p. 10; see also pp. 38-39).

**Chapter One** (largely developed from Hook, 2005) opens with the question of why postcolonial writers [Bhabha, Biko, Coetzee, Fanon, Manganyi] who are heavily involved with psychological concepts do not have a greater influence on the “growing orthodoxy of critical psychology?” Or, I love the way he puts it as “How might their use of the register of the psychological within the political, and their focus on the cultural dynamics of colonization alert us to the possibilities of psychology as a vocabulary of resistance?” (H, p. 14).

His introduction of postcolonial thought is made via Bhabha (1994/2004):

> “Postcolonial criticism bears witness to the unequal and uneven forces of cultural representation involved in the contest for political and social authority. . . .
> “Postcolonial perspectives emerge from the colonial testimony of Third World countries and the discourses of ‘minorities’ . . . [to] intervene in those ideological discourses of modernity that attempt to give a hegemonic ‘normality’ [which disadvantage peoples].” (Bhabha, 1994/2004, pp. 171-172/245-246; quoted by Hook, p. 16.)

Fanon’s psychopolitical dynamics is a continual interaction between the psychological and the political which takes three forms: (1) The constructivist view that psychology is influenced by the socio-political, (2) psychological concepts illuminate the ‘workings of power’, and (3) psychological concepts can act “as a means of consolidating resistance to power.”. (H, p. 18)

I particularly liked the following paragraph as its shows Hook’s ability to synthesize essential ideas of Critical Psychology and those of Fanon in particular, and because it points to drawing on several viewpoints in psychology, not just the psychoanalytic, his avowed main focus, and a main focus of the use of psychology in postmodern social philosophy:

Abraham 2 Review Hook’s Critical Psychology
“This, in many ways, is the Black Consciousness strategy: the utilization of rudimentary psychological notions to enable forms of radical humanist critique, as an experiential basis for solidarity and resistance to power, indeed as a means of giving form and focus to the liberation struggle. By examining the psychical effects of the colonized subjects’ attempts to know themselves within the terms of an antagonistic (white European) colonial system of values — the phenomena of a ‘white mask psychology’, socially induced ‘inferiority complexes’ — Fanon shows how what might otherwise be understood within a purely psychological framework is far better explained in political terms; that is, with reference to understandings of racialized power, colonial violence and cultural subordination. In this respect one witnesses in Fanon an astonish blend of theoretical figures, a kind of lateral movement across psychoanalytic, Marxist, existential, psychiatric and literary modes of conceptualization, all put to use as a means of expressing something of the identity-violence of colonial dispossession. A key problematic that Fanon is concerned with here is that of being the subject of cultural oppression/racism in which one is incessantly fed cultural values and understandings that are hostile, devaluing of one’s self and one’s culture.” (H, p. 18).

Hook segues to Steve Biko who “exemplifies a line of psychopolitics that utilizes the terms of psychological experience as a means of consolidating resistances to power, and in this respect he notably extends Fanon.” (H, p. 22). In other words, Black Consciousness [BC] plays a leading role, a necessary first step, in emancipation: “. . . mental emancipation as a precondition to political emancipation.” (Biko, 1978, p. 29. Taken from H, p. 23.) And, “. . . is not merely a passing stage in the revolutionary process . . . [but] an actuality in which the transformation of reality is grounded.” (Gibson, 2003, p. 136 as quoted in H, p. 24.) BC is thus “. . . a form of politics that utilizes the vernacular of the psychological so as to articulate disruptive historical experiences of oppression and marginality. (H, p. 25.) Blackness has a ‘historical underwriting’ of violent dispossession of land, labor, and culture. (Ibid.) Biko had to combat two tactics of oppressors, a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy, and a denigration that created an internalization of self-deprecation. (H, pp. 26-27.) The radical humanist politics requires that agency (H, pp. 27-30.), “[to replace] . . . the paralysing image of the victim [with] . . . an active agent of history in all spheres of life” (Pityana et al., 1991, p. 10; from H, p. 30.) Biko and BC used Freire’s concepts of conscientização and consciousness raising (Biko, 1978, p. 118; H, pp. 30-31; Freire, 1970/2005.) One of my graduate students despaired the difficulty of the Muslim-Christian conflict in the Philippines as revealed in a psychology study (De Guzman & Inzon, 2010), to which Hook would have replied: “if belief in change is a precondition for committed political action, then a different world must come into view if one is to extract one’s self from thefatalisms engendered by the political present.” (H, p. 31.)

Hook, in discussing ‘libidinal investments’, political emotions love, pride, fear, etc., points out that Biko goes beyond Fanon’s emphasis on anger to that of “the more fully developed sense of the political attributes of courage” in which he discusses the proximity of life and death both in the historical oppression and the brutality of violent confrontation, “[there is] . . . a conviction that life beyond death apparent in the conviction that the cost of one’s life will not end the life of the struggle.” (H, pp. 32-33.)
Biko concentrated on “. . . the creation and diffusion of a new consciousness rather than in the formation of a rigid organization” (Stubbs, 1978, p. 206 from H, p. 35) partly for strategic purposes. It “. . . meant it was impossible for apartheid authorities to decimate its institutional infrastructure . . .” It also enabled the multiplicity and interplay of everyday micro-political activities. But critics of BC maintain that “. . . at some point a mentality of resistance, a consciousness of activism needs to be translated into material and organizational forms.” (H, pp. 35-36.)

At this point, I must again turn to a longer quotation, that summarizes a great deal of what he has expressed to this point, and reveals his tremendous ability at analysis, conceptualization, expression, and style (this immediately follows the preceding quotation, p. 36):

“Having reached this conclusion, conceding that the political can never be reduced to the psychological alone, it remains nonetheless absolutely crucial to stress the indispensable role of Black Consciousness played — precisely as a psychopolitical form — in providing valuable psychological foundations for liberation. For the same reason it is vital that we extend our understanding of the psychological resources that underlie — and often indeed function as conditions of possibility for — effective forms of political resistance. Black Consciousness’s ‘platforms for resistance’ discussed above include the politically enabling psychological operations of consciousness-raising; the solidarity of resistant group identity; appeals to the experience of the oppressed; modes of introspection and self-critique; the marshaling of affect; the development of agency and positive (black) self-image; the production of a new social imaginary. . .

“Black Consciousness thought hence utilizes the idiom of the psychological as a strategic mode of doing politics. To be clear: by the idiom of the psychological I mean to refer both to psychology’s array of explanatory concepts and, more importantly perhaps, to its characteristic preoccupation f reflection on lived experience and identity, that is, to psychology s providing both vocabulary and form of resistance. This utilization is consistent in certain ways with how Fanon and Bhabha press the domain of the psychological into kinds of political work, enabling thus a psycho-existential examination of experiences of oppression, a prospective psychopolitical analysis of power and resistance.” (DHPC p. 36.)

Bhabha, opens the preface to the second edition of The Location of Culture with a discussion of the ‘vernacular cosmopolitan’, derived from the encounter of many diasporic and multicultural experiences of people

“. . . to forbear their despair, to work through their anxieties and alienations towards a life that may be radically incomplete but continues to be intricately communitarian, busy with activity, noisy with stories, garrulous with grotesquerie, gossip, humor, aspirations, fantasies — these were signs of a culture of survival that emerges from the other side of the colonial enterprise, the darker side. Naipaul’s people are vernacular cosmopolitans of a kind, moving in-between cultural traditions, and revealing hybrid forms of life and art that do not have a prior existence within the discrete world of an single culture or language.” (Bhabha, 2004, p. xiii.)
For Bhabha, such experiences give rise to the ability to understand the colonial condition and to formulate paths of resistance and empower social action.

Hook attributes some of these vernacular qualities to Biko and the Black Consciousness movement.

“Rather than being delimited to a matrix of psychological concepts, Black Consciousness utilizes instead a spread of historical, cultural and even theological revitalizations of black identity. Ally and Ally (2008) affirm this position, quoting the Soweto Action Committee’s 1978 resolution that Black Consciousness needed to be more than merely an ‘attitude of mind’. What we find in Biko then is something tantamount to a ‘vernacular’ critique, . . . the juxtaposition of a variety of vocabularies and discursive styles that enable vigorous forms of cultural identity and resistance. . . These dialects are blended, conjoined in seemingly spontaneous manner to respond to the urgent political imperatives of the racist apartheid/(post)colonial situation.” (H, p. 37.)

This vernacular quality derives from the basic political epistemology of postcolonial critical psychology which “produces operative forms of knowledge in response to injustice, and in line with the agenda creating a more equitable social order.” (H, p. 38.)

Hook’s purpose, as my own, is largely contrapuntal, that is that the lessons to be drawn from the BC movement may assist forms of critique for establishing forms of resistance, social change, and emancipation in different and future contexts.

As a denouement to this chapter, Hook has a brief summary perspective on each of his foundational authors. Fanon and Biko show “how postcolonial/anti-apartheid criticism offers a means of closing the gap between intellectual activity, between insular critique and impetus to broader social action.” Fanon emphasizes that psychology should help conceptualize oppression and cannot be “ignored in projects of liberation.” Biko, emphasizes Black Consciousness and the affective “marshaling of passions . . . that hold this identity, this cause, together. . . everyday activity is opened up to political recontextualization.” Fanon’s materialistic psychology, Bhabha’s hypridity, Said’s secular criticism, and Biko’s “vernacular psychology is never purist and is always attuned to the imperative of extending critical consciousness. Bhabha contends “. . . that it is from those who have suffered the sentence of history—subjugation, domination, diaspora,—that we learn our most enduring lessons for living and thinking. There is a growing conviction that the affective experience of social marginality—as it emerges in non-canonical cultural forms—transforms our critical strategies.” (Bhabha, 2004, p. 246). This creates the imperative for merging the psychopolitical with the postcolonial. “. . . a critical psychology that makes no real engagement with the theory or criticism of the postcolonial is no critical psychology at all. Likewise, those contemporary visions of political transformation—or indeed of anti-recist prais—that bypass the psychological, that incur no subjective effects, no identities of change, are likely not to prove effectively political at al.” (H, pp. 40-41).
Chapter Two  Here, Hook confronts the dehumanization, denigration, and abjections from racism. He suggests that a disturbing feature of Fanon’s *Black Skin, White Masks* lies in the *bricolage* nature of his text as if reflected the broken bodies of racism’s victims, what those of us in complexity theory might liken to the similarity across scale of fractal imagery, or the passing of attractor properties to another system by their linkages. The reality of racism is particularly apparent in the disjunction between the phenomenology of the body and the violence upon the body produced by racism which “troubles the structures of the symbolic and exceeds discursive capture”. These occur as an ‘operation of repulsion’ (Butler’s phrase, 1993) in an up and down sequence of body-ego-symbolic expulsive interactions. He extends Fanon with his emphasis on the dreads, aversions, and disgusts of the body that includes “socio-symbolic and historical” contexts, and offers an ‘extra discursive’ conceptualization impossible to achieve with rational or discursive approaches.

The first part of the chapter deals with the value of critical analysis and the limitations of discursive analyses. The Second part “introduces the idea of abjection as an operation of repulsion . . . the violence of an extra-discursive’ form of (post)colonial racism that impacts bodily, libidinal and symbolic registers.”

In contrast to theories that examine individual psychology as the basis for racism, “discursive conceptualization does not convert the social and political dimensions of racism into a set of internal psychological processes, . . . ”. Such an approach is important to understand social practices of domination, but has certain limitations with respect to a phenomenology “that is realized in impulses, played out in aversions and reactions of the body, a racism that appears to remain of yet unconditioned by discourse.” (H, p. 49).

While Hook proceeds to present a progression of discourse analysts, I particularly was interested in his discussion of Miles (1989) for whom racism “creates rigid systems of categorization . . . that involves (1) particular representations of real or imagined somatic features and (2) attributions of negatively evaluated characteristics. These processes are supported by ‘racialization’, a dialectical process in which social relations between people have been structured by the signification of certain human characteristic in ways that construct [an ideology of] differentiated [and distorted] social collectivities.” Hook sees this approach as overly analytical and reductive, and thus ‘under-defined’ in its quest for ‘analytical accuracy’, but contributing to ‘explaining social processes’. He lauds Miles for criticizing the reification of terms which should instead be subjected to deconstruction. (H, p. 51.) At this point, he suggests, as have others, that discourse analysis be supplemented by psychoanalysis, (H. p. 55), a major psychological recourse of much of poststructural and postcolonial literature (Poster, 1989; Bhabha, 2004).

The discursive psychopolitical and the subjective psychoanalytical should conflate in an interactive symmetry to preserve the analysis of contextual issues in order to grasp the nature of social power and its genesis of desire and passion, i.e., “how power intersects with subjectivity.”
. . . “Such production occurs at least partly within the machinery of subjectivity that is not entirely accessible to rational discursive means.” (H. pp. 56-7).

Next, Hook takes up a distinction of ‘unmediated racism’ and ‘discursive consciousness’, which at first I wanted to avoid discussing due to its complexity which might require reverting to his language, and then I saw a way of discussing it with respect to how I perceived it related to two of my favorite authors, Habermas (‘lifeworld’ in his 1998 book viii) whom he brings in at this point, and Bhabha, whom I bring in for his parallel to how I see this concept. Hook mentions ‘habitualized racism’ which involves a conflict between liberalized beliefs in equality and engrained racist aversions, and draws on Giddon’s (1984) distinction between ‘discursive consciousness’ (verbalizable) and ‘practical consciousness’ which is ‘at the periphery of focused conscious awareness’.

Ok, now I think I get it. First it relates to my own concept of a continuum of awareness, rather than its being simply a binary condition, and one that in in dynamical system terms we could conceive of as some control parameters being used by navigation in this racial awareness space. Such dynamics admit gradual change, prone to interruptions of dramatic transformations involving bifurcations into multiple basins of attractions ix. This is an in-between space, or intermediate basin of attraction, similar to that which Bhabha identifies as a the interstitial space occupied by someone lodging in disporic displacement within a multicultural racially community afflicted with racism, such as Bhabha himself experienced, as also with Naipaul’s characters that he cites. From this space, emerges an articulation of racism and oppression, previously elided over (this is the focus on the ‘vernacular cosmopolitan’ in the preface to the second edition of Bhabha’s book, 2004). “Now while there is something virtual about the distinction in question—in practice it would seem very difficult to trace the dividing line between those elements of consciousness that are explicitly discursive and those that make up the ‘extra discursive’ backdrop of lifeworld or savoir faire knowledge forms.” (H, p. 58). The distinction is less problematic for overt culturally sanctioned racism, than for neoliberalized contemporary cultures which do not explicitly condone contemporary racism.

At this point I recall what might be called Hook’s triad of the discursiveness of racism, its phenomenological modes: body-ego-symbolic. This triad he alternatively characterized as embodiment, the affective-libidinal, and the ‘extra-discursive. He also brings in several poststructuralists, especially Kristeva, mainly as a principal architect of the use of abjection, and it dawns on me that other aspects of Kristeva have been driving some of his conceptions, and especially why she is so important to these distinctions, despite that fact that her principal domain of discourse deals more with genderism than Hook’s focus on racism. She makes parallel distinctions between Freud’s pre-Oedipal and Oedipal stages, primary processes and secondary processes, feminine and masculine, Plato’s chora vs. topos (Timeaus), Hesiod’s Kronos vs. Gorgias’s Kairos and Bergson’s durée, and most importantly, semiotics vs. the symbolic. To which I added the rather loose metaphorical distinction between nonlinear and linear dynamical processes. x Kristeva herself invoked morphogenesis (later morphed into catastrophe theory, and
then, singularity theory, bifurcation theory, chaos theory and dynamical systems’ theory) of René Thom (1972/1975), with whom she was familiar in Paris.

For Hook, social construction includes both the imaginary and the symbolic. The imaginary is ego-centric mirroring that includes both representation and misrepresentation of the self and misrepresentation. The symbolic is an anthropological-like codification of social relationships, that enable differentiations and distinctions. There is a “… crucial distinction between signified and signifier, that is, the difference between the imaginary function of meaning and the operation of the symbolic framework that structures meaning.” It is important to investigate the imaginary and symbolic aspects of racism. It is not sufficient to contain the understanding “within the dialectics of intersubjectivity.” “Supplementary forms of psychological analysis” are not sufficient to overcome this limitation, and imaginary activity must occur within “a symbolic frame that brings a hierarchical interplay of values in operation.” (H, pp. 66-68).

Abjection and Racism

*Abject* as verb denotes the reaction to a reviled object, while as a noun it refers to the reviled object that elicits repugnance. They occur as an interactive process and recapitulate an existing social order. (H, p. 68). An *abjector*xi, one who expresses reaction to a specified object, is in a position of power, while the *abjectee*, one who is identified as the abject object, “is robbed of power and the right to social inclusion” and equality. (Herbst, 1999, p. 16; H, p. 69). The psychoanalytic and anthropological aspect also are interactive, that is at the body-libidinal and social-symbolic spheres. Referring to Butler’s analysis (1993) “Self protection, or escape, is immanent in the subject who experiences the ‘border-anxiety’ of abjection, there is immediate recourse to offensive action indeed to violent forms of response…” (H, p. 69). What is disrupted here is the boundary of the ego, the ability to distinguish self from other. (Chrisholm, 1992; H, p. 69). The abjectee retains desirable qualities along with their repugnant qualities for the abjector. “…it keys into a prohibited mode of enjoyment, hence the strength of the desperation, of the reflex to expel it, to confirm it as separate.” (H, pp. 69-70. This is a classic approach-avoidance conflict (Dollard & Miller, 1950), which sought to define the psychoanalytic concept of reaction formation.xii

According to Kristeva (1982), the response is subconscious and thus primarily outside and overrides the discursive-symbolic. One detects it from the repulsion.xiii There is no common property of the abject other than difference: “…a variety of different relations of contact and divisions.” Abjection can be displaced, transferred, projected in the effort to protect one’s ego, which accounts for its varieties, usually following hierarchical social chains. “This fact, that any number of objects, features or environments may manifest the abject provides a useful consideration in grasping the generalizability of racist sentiment, in conceptualizing the proliferation of bigotry across such an extraordinary range of characteristic associated to cultural others. The logic of hate requires no static reference.” (H, p. 70).
The discursive, social, symbolic and the extra-discursive, bodily, semiotic aspects of racism interact, but can be viewed as distinct. Abjection “is at once somatic and symbolic” (Kristeva, 1988, pp. 135-136), but “…there can be no abject other than that which can be socially designated.” (H, p. 71). One role of abjection is to eject the abjective qualities from the self, protect the ego, keep the boundary safe, protect against the dissolution of the ego, against death. It is a revolt against the external menace. (H, p. 73, based on Grosz, 1994; Kristeva, 1982, 1988). “Abjection is closer to the sickness, the self-defiling desperation that pre-empts the descent into formlessness, into the inchoate state of the *corps morcelé.*,” The abjectee’s corporeal, experiential, and social position is broken up and replaced by a racist perspective. (Fanon, 1952/1986, p. 112; H, p. 75). Abjection plays a pivotal role in Kristeva’s treatment of the ontogeny of the semiotic to semantic, language playing a significant role in this transition. (H, p.76).

As I am reading all this, I am thinking that here is lot of good fuel for abjectees and abjectors to reflect on their own self-understanding/misunderstanding and to help the other do the same. It is fuel for an emancipatory political agenda toward which psychology has much to offer. Then all of a sudden, Hook has a contrary concern. Recognition of a class distinction of abjection might empower the abjectors, blunting its political potential of this consciousness raising. Huh? I can’t seem to wrap myself around that one, but he explains the source of concern within a footnote (#20, p. 92, tagged on p. 73) on Kreisteva suggesting that her analysis might be so ‘poetic’ “that it tacitly romanticizes abjection.”

My hope for the promotion of an emancipatory political agenda, as suggested by the discussion of Black Consciousness, is also tempered by some other countervailing cautions. These arrive from the discussion of the primacy of emotion versus intellectual debates (Douglas, 2002; Hemming, 2005; Kirsteva, ; Lacan,1988; Levi-Strauss, 1963; others) which evolved in Hook’s hands to an integrative, I would say, systems view, of his body-ego-society spheres, with influences running up and down that sequence. While Kristeva make the affective pre-Oedipal primary, Hook counters with “…even the most primal ‘pre-verbal’ experiences occur within . . . a world in which symbolic functioning is ubiquitous.” And that “[It is an error to slip] into an egoic/imaginary register by prioritizing the terms of singular experience over the frame of intersubjective symbolic interaction … there is no ‘individual experience’ prior to the advent of an ego that requires a dialectic interchange with others.” The theory of abjection can exaggerate the individual subjectivity risking overlooking the “the abject is symbolically determined.” “Although [affect] exceeds the ‘gentrification’ of prevailing discursive and eludes full symbolic mediation, it remains nonetheless within an imaginary symbolic frame, within the ambit of of ongoing (if unsuccessful) attempts to domesticate its excessive, potentially traumatic quality …” (H, pp. 81-83).

This idea segues to Hemming’s caution contra the hope for this energy providing a challenge to prevailing norms:
Sedgewick’s (2003) affective freedom…”[typically] manifests precisely not as difference, but as central mechanism of social reproduction in the most glaring of way. The delights of consumerism, feelings of belonging attending fascism … are affective responses that strengthen rather than challenge a dominant social order.” (Hemming, 2005, p. 551; quoted in H, p. 83).

Hook then summarizes some of the dynamics of the affective-cognitive struggle in nearly systems-theoretical style. He talks of discourse producing temporary stability to meanings but that affect can create bifurcations, instabilities, interruptions, fragmentations, that are short of pathologies. “Abjection is not revolutionary: the … system of relationships that make up the symbolic network may have for a time being interrupted … but the symbolic order … has by no means been disabled. If anything, one might wager, it has been strengthened… the threat, the prospective fragmentations of racism cannot be assigned to any one of these (somatic, psychological or symbolic) dimensions of sociality; we are concerned with a nervousness of multiple dimensions, one that reverberates across interlinked registers.” (H, pp. 84-87).

Critical social psychology must explain how these work in combination “in differing arrangements of symbolic operation, imaginary identity and embodied passion—to produce something of the persistence that makes racism such an obdurate formation.” (H, p. 88). Hook suggests two ways to analyze the intersection of social practice and libidinal economy, the first being a psychoanalytic analysis of racist discourse that recognizes the ‘extra-discursive’ on the one hand and the political, knowledge-power relationships in society, “unless we are able to take such ‘extra-discursive’ factors into account, to see how they underwrite and and exert a driving influence upon racist patterns of signification, we do not appreciate the full significance of racist discourse.” (H, p. 89).

In the second we again see a reflection of concepts from complex systems theory. “…what lies outside discourse—what discourse never fully assimilates, encompasses—is not simply inchoate, formless.” [That could be called ‘order within chaos’.] “By contrast, one might discern regularly occurring arrangements and distribution of affect. So, although libidinal force and discursive construction seem to be incommensurable vectors, there is a logic of sorts, indeed an economy within which to understand their relation.” To be taken up in the next chapter. (H, pp. 88-89).

References


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**End Notes**

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1. This review is a diary of ideas in preparation for a review of the book, and is intended for me and the students of the graduate seminar at Silliman. Besides informing myself, it responds to some ideas of others in the seminar, Psychology 314, Critical Psychology at Silliman University, to support their ideas on the importance of diversity—related to Said’s (1984, 1993) concept of contrapuntal, and Sundararajan’s (2011) concept of harmony—in resistance to power issues raised by Hook (see top of pp. 4 & 6 this review), and the importance of forging ahead with a psychopolitical agenda, as is the purpose of Critical Psychology. For example, a reading of DeGuzman and Inzon (2010) was discouraging in terms of expecting a settlement, especially since the resolution has recently worsened despite having been on a negotiation track, of the Muslim-Christian conflict on Mindanao, but the dynamics of the insurgency should be addressable with judicious use of psychopolitical ideas. Similarly, aid to victims of the flood, being aided by psychologists, could include appeals to the political exploitative aspects that worsened the nature and impact of the floods.

2. “Through a contrapuntal reading, Said engaged in a ‘reading back’ to uncover the ‘submerged but crucial presence of empire in canonical texts’ and to demonstrate ‘the complementarity and interdependence instead of isolated, venerated, or formalized experience that excludes and forbids the hybridizing intrusions of human history.’” (Chowdry, 2007, p. 104)

3. “. . . the point is that contrapuntal reading must take account of both processes, that of imperialism and that of resistance to it, which can be done by extending our reading of the texts to include what was once forcibly excluded.” (Said, 1993, pp. 66-67, quoted in Chowdry.) These are reminiscent of the Derrida-Heidegger concepts of sous rature and Derrida’s deconstruction. (Sarup, 1993, p. 33.)

4. Bhabha, The *Location of Culture*, Chapter 9, The postcolonial and the postmodern: The question of agency. I recommend the special 2004 Routledge Classic edition for its wonderful new preface on vernacular cosmopolitanism. For that edition, Hook’s citations of pp. 171-172 of the 1994 original are pp. 245-246 in 2004. One may also note that Bhabha’s Chapter 2, The commitment to theory, is relevant to the discussion of the importance of theory to action, and that the reference to ‘intervening’ draws a lineage of challenging logocentrism, idealism, and totalization, back to Horkheimer & Adorno (1947/1972), and in turn back to Hegel, perhaps the first to challenge the precepts of modernity, and forward to Fanon’s “[W]e must join the people in that fluctuating movement which they are just giving a shape to . . . which will be the signal for everything to be called into question . . . it is to the zone of occult instability where the people dwell that we must come.” (Fanon, 1961/1990, pp.182-183, quoted by Bhabha, 2004, Chapter 2, p. 51) and Bhabha’s “no master narrative” (Bhabha, 1986, vii; quoted in Hook, 2005, p. 479; 2012, p. 17). And these relate to my own invocation of systems theory for the importance of instability in order for change (bifurcation) to occur (Abraham, 2010).

5. Black consciousness broke into print in *Freedom’s Journal* (Cornish & Russman, 1827-1829) and (Walker, 1829), was expressed as double consciousness by W.E.B Du Bois a century later, and reached a crescendo with the the Blank Panthers (1966-1982) and Steve Biko, co-founder and first president of the South African Student Organization. He was influenced by Malcolm X, Eldridge Cleaver, Stokely Carmichael, Martin Luther King Jr., and James Cone. As editor of the SASO Newsletter, under the pseudonym of Frank Talk, he wrote a series of articles called *I Write What I Like* from 1969 to 1972, later collected in a book (Biko, 1978/1987); H, p. 31; also see *Online Encyclopedia.*

6. Fanon (originally coined this terms as the French, conscienciser in *Black Skins, White Masks*). Here used in Freire’s (1952/1986) original Portugese, and translated, oddly enough, into English, as conscientization.

7. Bricolage: makeshift; construct from diverse sources or research methods.
We tend to interpret 'deconstruction' as what is seems, peeling the onion, looking into finer distinctions underlying the meaning of terms or things. But I like Taylor's summary of Derrida's meaning, which in turn depends on Heidegger's concept of 'sous rature', crossing something out, and seeing what has been lost. "The guiding insight of deconstruction is that every structure—be it literary, psychological, social, economic, political or religious—that organizes our experience is constitute and maintained through acts of exclusion. In the process of creating something, something else inevitably gets left out. These exclusive structure can become repressiv—and that repression come with consequences. In a manner reminiscent of Freud, Mr. Derrida insists that what is repressed does not disappear but always returns to unsettle every construction, no matter how secure it seems. As an Algerian Jew writing in France during the postwar years in the wake of totalitarianism on the right (facism) as well as the left (Stalinism), Mr Derrida understood all too well the danger of beliefs and ideologies that divide the world into diametrical opposites: right or left, red or blue, good or evil, for us or against us. He showed how these repressive structures, which grew directly out of the Western intellectual and cultural tradition, threatened to return with devastating consequences. By struggling to find ways to overcome patterns that exclude the differences that make life worth living, he developed a vision that is consistently ethical." (Taylor, 2004). These are also captured in Bhabha's usage of term like elision, as applied to passing by poverty and discrimination without hardly noticing they are there, instead of letting empathy guide one to action as well as to more active features of racism and postcolonialism.

Husserl developed 'lifeworld' as a 'we'-world-phenomenology, but Habermas extended it as part of his concepts of communicative action governed by a pragmatic rationality, his positive departure from Horkheimer and Adorno's (1947/1972) darkly critical theory which rejected rationality (often criticized as, 'throwing the baby out with the bathwater.' Frank has analyzed how the crisis in modern society is because "the integrative action has been increasingly disabled (Habermas would say 'colonized') . . . systems media have become de-coupled from the lifeworld . . . members of the community have less sphere for communicative action." (Abraham, 2011) and Deibert among many others have discussed how hypemedia has changed this for systems (big institutions) and social movements, mostly in favor of the postcolonial aspects of global capitalism.

Recent applications of complexity theory to issues of racism and emancipation appear not only in my writings, but also in papers and presentations by Hill (2012) and McCullough (1977, 2012).

I became familiar with her ideas while exploring their use in an undergraduate course on the Psychology of Creativity at Silliman University, the connection being the overflow of feminine libidinal energy (arising from the Lacanian mirror stage) into the discourse of marginality, dissidence, and subversion. Creativity and change depend upon this energy; creativity often runs afoul of authority despite often trying to work within its rules and institutions. “She observes that semiotic forms of signification don’t fit in the rational symbolic order and thus threaten their sovereignty and so have been relegated to the margins of discourse (Sarup, 1993). 'Repression of the nonlinear, i.e., an alternative consciousness and perception of the world, is the result of the ascendancy of patriarchy and logocentrism that privileges male rationality, . . . Repression of a rationality suppresses both the female and human unconsciousness. . . . It [a chaos-like pre-Oedipal semiotics] is a way to challenge the domination of the androcentric construction of the mind as rational ego . . . ' to move on to a post-post-Oedipal stage (the post-Oedipal stage is a ‘capitulation to patriarchy’). (interior quotes from Murphy, 1995) This paragraph is taken from Abraham (1998). Hook treats the semiotic/semantic ontogenesis on p. 76; I discovered after writing up to this point.

I invent the terms abjector and abjectee to shorthand my expression of Hook’s ideas.

Neal Miller, a behavioral and neurophysiological psychologist, in private conversation, told me that as he was finishing his PhD, that he went to Europe to study this with Freud (whom he did not succeed in meeting) and when he returned, he started his now classical animal studies of the 1930’s to provide an animal model for this conflict. This story has since been confirmed in Wikipedia. Kurt Lewin developed a similar theory within his field theory framework, rather than Miller’s behavioral one, but the two are essentially identical.

One might note a greater affinity to the James-Lange neurophysiological theory of emotion than to the Cannon-Bard theory, now both supplanted by the limbic theories (Papez-MacLean) which takes a more complex system interactive view of brain function.

In dynamical systems theory we might metaphorically express this as a self-organizational attempt to avoid a bifurcation into a high-dimensional attractor of self, beyond the ability of self-restoration, a self-hood of a humpty
I would summarize some of Hook’s theory with a three dimensional state space (body, psyche, social), with basins of attractions, and a response diagram or bifurcation diagram showing differing portraits of these changing attractors. But this would be an exercise for those who like that perspective, but likely would add little substantive to the theory. Hook’s theory is dynamical without specifically identifying itself within this modeling lineage. (Abraham, 1998, 2010, 2011). In fact, in keeping with the preceding footnote, we may say that difficulty in trying to partial the semiotic from the semantic, the body-emotions-id from the cognitive ego and superego, has been a problematic for the search for integrative features of the brain and nervous/humoral systems, and theories of the varieties I suggested in these two footnotes were developed by Rabinovich & Muezzinoglu (2012) and see http://impleximundi.com/tiki-read_article.php?articleId=110#comments. According to their views, these domains can be represented by separate components within a global interactive neural network, and they have a multistable relationship, with dominant roles shifting between them, as with most complex systems. This is in contradistinction to much post-modern literature where battles between the primacy of speech, writing, and emotions have enjoyed much discussion.

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so if you read the first one, you can pick up with the last 3 lines of p. 6.